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COMMENTARY ON
FREE SPEECH, PAMPHLETEERING AND
POLITICS*
S. Douglas Doddt
I would like to start off by noting that I am not sure this particular
term of the Court necessarily gave great comfort to the news media.
It probably left the news media with more questions than answers.
But in the First Amendment free speech area, there was one decision
that does have potentially wide ranging implications, and that is McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.1 First, I want to very briefly give
the facts of the case. On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre, who was
a private citizen in the state of Ohio, distributed leaflets to persons
attending a public meeting at Blendon Middle School in Westerville,
Ohio. The leaflets expressed Ms. McIntyre's opposition to an upcom-
ing school tax levy issue. The superintendent of schools was scheduled
to discuss the tax levy election at the meeting.2
The tax levy election was defeated. In fact, it was defeated twice.
Ultimately, it passed upon its third appearance in an election contest,
which occurred in November of 1988. So, six or so months after her
leafleteering, her passing out of her own privately created leaflets op-
posing the tax levy, some school official, who the Court's decision ti-
dily leaves unnamed, complained to the Ohio Election Commission
that Ms. McIntyre had violated a provision of the Ohio Election Law
by passing out anonymous leaflets. It should be noted that not all of
Ms. McIntyre's leaflets were anonymous. Some of them had her name
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995.
t Partner, Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, Tilsa, Oklahoma. B.A. University of
Tulsa, 1971; J.D. University of Tlsa College of Law, 1981.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
2. Id. at 1514.
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on them, and some others purported to present the views of 'Con-
cerned Parents and Taxpayers.'3
The Ohio Election Commission determined that Ms. McIntyre's
distribution of anonymous leaflets did in fact violate a portion of the
statute and fined her $100. She appealed the fine and the case was
finally overturned by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. It
probably should have stopped right there but it did not. The Election
Commission appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which in a
sharply divided vote reinstated the fine based upon its announced un-
derstanding that it had to follow precedent set by the Ohio Supreme
Court. Ms. McIntyre then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court and
that Court, not surprisingly, affirmed the Court of Appeals. So at this
point, she still had the $100 fine against her.4
During this process, Ms. McIntyre died and the trustee of her es-
tate continued the fight, petitioning the United States Supreme Court
for writ of certiorari. Certiorari was granted and this opinion ensued.,
The legal standards that the Court discussed in the McIntyre case
include the premise that core political speech is protected by the First
Amendment and it need not center on a candidate for office, but also
applies to issue-based elections, as this one was. More importantly,
however, the Court held that exacting scrutiny must be applied when
a law is challenged under the First Amendment as burdening core
political speech. The Court also held that restrictions on core political
speech can only be upheld if they are narrowly tailored to serve over-
riding state interests.6
The Court found in McIntyre that the Ohio statute did not set
forth a sufficiently compelling or overriding state interest to justify the
burdening of freedom of core political speech. Ohio argued in this
case that it had an interest in providing the electorate with relevant
information - in fact they argued more relevant information (I am
not quite sure what that is) and also an interest in preventing fraud
and libel in the election process. The Supreme Court of the United
States disagreed, saying that the interest in providing the electorate
with relevant information was not sufficiently compelling to justify the
prohibition against the distribution of anonymous campaign literature.
The interest in providing additional relevant information to voters, the
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1515.
5. Id. at 1516.
6. Id. at 1519.
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Court said, simply did not justify requiring writers to make statements
or disclosures that they would not otherwise make, or perhaps that
they did not want to make. And the Court viewed this as actually
being broader than just a question of anonymity of a political state-
ment. The Court compared it, for example, to a hypothetical law that
might require a person to omit or include information in their speech
- particularly political speech - that he or she did not want to omit
or include. The Court said that the signature or the identity of the
writer or the speaker was the type of information that the speaker or
writer might very well want to omit and should not be required by the
law to include.7
A historical look at the importance of allowing anonymity in
political speech was taken by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion,
and it was pointed out that anonymity in political speech, leaflets and
newspaper articles has been a tradition - I am not sure whether it is a
proud tradition or some other kind of tradition - but nevertheless a
tradition since the beginning of this country. The Court pointed out
that during the time leading up to the establishment of the United
States as a separate country, many of the arguments that were circu-
lated around the colonies were made under fictitious names because
of the writers' fear of reprisals from the Crown. This practice was
followed throughout the history of the United States, the Court ar-
gued, by the need - the perceived need, perhaps - of some writers
not to place their name upon their writing. The Court said the First
Amendment absolutely protects that right to anonymity.'
The interest that the State of Ohio argued it had in preventing
fraud and libel was also not sufficient, since the statutory prohibition
against distribution of anonymous campaign literature applied regard-
less of whether there were even arguably false or misleading state-
ments in the information. Further, the Court found that Ohio had
other and more specific statutory protections to guard against and find
remedies for the use or distribution of fraudulent or libelous materi-
als. So the two reasons that the State of Ohio said it had for this type
of prohibition - one must put one's name on one's campaign litera-
ture - the Court said, 'You didn't meet your burden. You didn't
show that the interest was either compelling or overriding enough to
burden core political speech and the freedom of that speech.' The
7. Id. at 1516-17.
8. Id. at 1517, 1524.
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Court also said that there are other ways to protect those interests
without requiring this particular type of burden on speech.
The holding of the Court in McIntyre was that § 3599.09(A)9
the relevant statute in Ohio - abridged freedom of speech and was a
violation of the First Amendment. The freedom of the public, the
Court said, to anonymously campaign for or against a political issue
was protected by the First Amendment and, the Court said, as it had
previously held in Talley v. California,'0 that this freedom extends be-
yond just the literary realm to the advocacy of political issues. By the
way, Talley v. California, which was decided some years earlier, struck
down an ordinance in the City of Los Angeles which was an absolute
prohibition of anonymous leafleteering. It was not limited to political
speech, but applied to all leaflets. The speech could have been polit-
ical or it could been commercial advertising, but the statute was an
absolute ban on anonymous leafleteering. The Supreme Court said in
Talley that prohibition was not permissible and struck down that ordi-
nance. The McIntyre Court did say that a state might somehow
demonstrate that its enforcement interest justifies a more limited
identification requirement regarding campaign literature, but that the
Ohio statute did not meet that burden."
Now this particular decision by the Supreme Court was a seven-
to-two decision. Five members of the Court joined in the majority
opinion. One member of the Court, Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concur-
ring opinion, and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justice
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in
that opinion. The dissent is interesting because it takes a very practi-
cal approach to this problem. The dissent notes that every state in the
union with the exception of California - probably because of Talley
- has a very similar type of prohibition against anonymous campaign
literature. Justice Scalia says, in effect, 'What are all these states going
to have to do? Is this going to mean a wholesale reexamination of
every statute in the United States that has to do with campaign litera-
ture?' He appeared to think that the majority was doing too much re-
examination in solving this problem, but two justices in dissent cannot
carry the day.
9. Omio REV. CODE § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).
10. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
11. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
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As previously noted the McIntyre decision will impact every state
which has such a statute. Indeed, Oklahoma has a statute that is simi-
lar to the Ohio statute. The Oklahoma statute is found in Title 21,
§ 1840,12 and it is, interestingly enough, headed "Anonymous Cam-
paign Literature." This statute will probably have difficulty standing
as a result of this case. It is not, however, as broad as Ohio's statute.
In fact, in light of the 1987 10th Circuit decision Wilson v. Stocker, 3
which held the previous Oklahoma anonymous campaign literature vi-
olation statute unconstitutional, there seem to have been some
changes that were made in the Oklahoma statute to perhaps coat it
with the patina of constitutional respectability. It, for example, deals
more with identifying who was responsible for paying for the literature
than with just being responsible for the literature.'4
The Court in McIntyre did indicate that its previous decisions that
approved restrictions upon information or requirements of informa-
tion relating to campaign expenditures still stand. First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti'5 is a landmark case in requiring that type of dis-
closure. The Valeo16 case was another one that fell within that area,
and the Supreme Court said both of those cases still stand. It is still
possible to have a legitimate overriding state interest in protecting the
election process by having those types of financial requirements, but
states cannot require individuals, particularly, to place their names
upon the writings that they disseminate.
I think that the questions that remain unanswered at this point
involve whether this rule that is set down in McIntyre is going to apply
to political committees, campaign committees, and more expensive
campaigns - remember, Ms. McIntyre was writing this at home on
her computer and paying a copy shop to print up a few sheets. As in
all good Supreme Court decisions, the answer is "we don't know."
12. OKu.A. STAT. tit. 21, § 1840(A) (Supp. 1996) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person... to cause to be broadcast, written, printed, posted
or distributed a statement, circular, poster, or advertisement which is designed to influ-
ence the voters on the nomination or election of a candidate or to influence the voters
on any constitutional or statutory amendment or on any other issue in a state, county,
city, or school district election, or to influence the vote of any member of the Legisla-
ture, unless there appears in a conspicuous place upon such circular, poster, or adver-
tisement, or within a broadcast statement, either the name and address of the person
who paid for the communication if an individual, or the name and address of the presi-
dent, chairman, or secretary, or two officers of the organization, if an organization
which paid for the communication.
13. 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1840(A) (Supp. 1996).
15. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
16. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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However, this does show at least that the current Supreme Court rec-
ognizes that there is a First Amendment, which is something that I
appreciate. I hope that in the next term, there will be some decisions
that show the Court is just as willing to enforce the rights provided by
the First Amendment for people who are involved in non-political
speech.
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